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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

“A DELICATE INQUIRY”: FOREIGN POLICY CONCERNS REVIVE
THE REVENUE RULE IN THE SECOND CIRCUIT AND BAR
FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS FROM SUING BIG TOBACCO

INTRODUCTION
In 2004, a pack of cigarettes in France cost approximately $6.40 (U.S.), a
fifty percent increase from 2002.1 This increase reflected, in part, the French
government’s effort to reduce the ill-effects of smoking by raising cigarette
taxes.2 France was not alone; over the course of the previous decade, other
European nations had instituted significant cigarette tax increases of their
own.3 In addition to raising revenue and discouraging consumers from using
tobacco, the cigarette tax increases have had the unintended effect of
increasing black market activity.4 According to some experts, as much as
twenty percent of cigarettes imported into the domestic markets of some
European countries are thought to be lost to illicit transactions.5 Cigarette
smuggling is estimated to have cost European nations $1.5 billion in revenue
over the last ten years.6 Much of this smuggling activity has been blamed on
efforts by United States cigarette-makers, who are struggling to earn a profit in
an increasingly health-conscious European consumer market.7

1. Elaine Sciolino, For the Tobacconists of France, Life’s a Pack of Trouble, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 13, 2003, at A4.
2. Peter Ford, Europe’s Smokers Feel Heat, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Oct. 24, 2003,
at W1, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2003/1024/p01s04-woeu.html. France increased
cigarette taxes incrementally over three years. Id.
3. See id. (noting the cigarette tax increase of 55% over five years in Great Britain); Steven
Lee Meyers, For Europe’s Sake, Spotting Moonshine Among Swans, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2005, at
A4 (noting the cigarette tax increase of 15% in Lithuanian over one year). Ireland went beyond a
tax increase and instituted a ban on smoking in many public areas, including the workplace.
Ford, supra note 2. Holland and Norway also instituted bans but included many exceptions. Id.
4. Anne Macdiarmid, Black Market Cigarettes May Cloud Future, BALTIMORE SUN, May
31, 1998, at 4F. The nations that make up the European Union are particularly susceptible to
cigarette smuggling because of the nations’ close proximity to each other and the wide disparity
in cigarette taxes between neighboring countries. Suzanne Daley, Europeans Suing Big Tobacco
in U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2000, at A1.
5. See Daley, supra note 4.
6. See id. Tax avoidance schemes are estimated to cost foreign governments worldwide
over $500 billion annually. Tax Justice Network, Tax Us If You Can, http://www.taxjustice.net/
cms/front_content.php?idcat=30 (last visited Nov. 12, 2006).
7. See Daley, supra note 4.
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In an effort to recover part of this lost revenue, foreign governments have
turned to United States law.8 The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO) criminalizes a wide-range of smuggling schemes,
including those designed to evade taxes.9 RICO also provides a private
enforcement mechanism for parties who are injured by conduct that amounts to
a RICO violation.10 As an incentive to individuals and corporations to make
use of the private enforcement mechanism, civil RICO entitles a prevailing
party to treble damages based on the monetary injury suffered due to the
racketeering activity.11
But foreign governments are generally barred from recovering tax revenue
in federal court. A claim that enforces foreign tax law raises a number of
concerns.12 First, the Constitution assigns the duty of dealing with matters of
foreign policy to the executive branch.13 Therefore, judicial review of a
foreign tax claim is said to violate the constitutional principle of separation of
powers.14 Second, assigned the responsibility of deciding matters of domestic
law, federal courts are said to have no obligation to clog their dockets with
cases based on foreign tax law.15 Third, because judges in the federal court
system are not trained in foreign tax law, federal courts are said to lack
competence to review foreign tax claims.16 In recognition of these concerns,
the revenue rule doctrine precludes domestic courts from enforcing foreign tax
8. Id. Other than seeking a remedy through U.S. law, foreign governments often lack
tenable options. See Lena Ayoub, Nike Just Does It—And Why the United States Shouldn’t: The
United States’ Obligation to Hold MNCs Accountable for Their Labor Rights Violations Abroad,
11 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 395, 422 (1999) (positing that foreign governments often ignore labor rights
violations by American corporations abroad out of economic considerations). Even if extradition
proceedings were successful, the odds of recovering a judgment from a U.S. multinational
corporation in a court of foreign jurisdiction are slim. See id.; see also Hanson Hosein,
Unsettling: Bhopal and the Resolution of International Disputes Involving an Environmental
Disaster, 16 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 285, 300–01 (1993) (noting that the Indian legal system
does not recognize the same injuries to personal rights as the U.S. legal system).
9. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968 (2000) (as amended by Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 813, 115 Stat.
272, 383 (2001)).
10. § 1964(c).
11. Id.
12. See Att’y Gen. of Canada v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc., 268 F.3d 103, 137
(2d Cir. 2001) (Calibrisi, J., dissenting).
13. See U.S. CONST. art. II, §§ 1–2.
14. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936).
15. See infra notes 109–114 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 115–120 and accompanying text. Another reason given for barring
foreign tax claims is that the federal court system is simply busy enough as it is. See John W.
Wade, On Frivolous Litigation: A Study of Tort Liability and Procedural Sanctions, 14 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 433, 435–36 (1986) (blaming court clog on “the continued increase in population, the socalled litigation explosion, the substantial increase in very complex cases involving multiple
parties, the influence of inflation on damage verdicts, and the steadily broadening application of
the law of torts” (citations omitted)).
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law.17 According to Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law, “Courts in
the United States are not required to recognize or to enforce judgments for the
collection of taxes, fines, or penalties rendered by the courts of other states.”18
It is not clear, however, whether civil RICO claims brought by foreign
governments to recover tax revenue are prohibited by the revenue rule.19
These claims “enforce” a domestic statute as well as a foreign tax law.20 The
revenue rule has never been interpreted to bar a claim that amounts to the
enforcement of a domestic statute.21 Case law reaching back to the doctrine’s
origins does not provide a clear answer to the question of whether the revenue
rule bars a “mixed” claim; that is, a suit enforcing both a domestic statute and a
foreign tax law.22
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals recently held that the revenue rule
does bar a foreign government’s civil RICO claim when that claim is based on
violations of the foreign government’s tax law.23 The European Community
(the E.C.)24 brought a civil RICO claim against U.S. cigarette-maker R.J.R.
Nabisco, Inc.25 The E.C.’s claim was based on allegations that the cigarettemaker violated foreign tax law by smuggling cigarettes into the plaintiffgovernments’ territories.26 The revenue rule applied, according to the court,
because the claim violated the separation of powers principle.27 Furthermore,
by characterizing the E.C.’s claim as the extraterritorial enforcement of a
foreign tax law, the court was concerned that the suit raised national
sovereignty concerns.28
This Note argues that the court’s reading of the revenue rule was
unnecessarily broad and hence the court’s separation of powers and national
17. Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349, 364 (2005).
18. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 483 (1987).
19. Att’y Gen. of Canada v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc., 268 F.3d 103, 138 (2d
Cir. 2001) (Calibrisi, J., dissenting).
20. See id. at 138–39.
21. Pasquantino, 544 U.S. at 364.
22. Id.
23. European Community v. R.J.R. Nabisco, Inc., 424 F.3d 175 (2d Cir. 2005).
24. The European Community, or the European Economic Community, was formed in 1957
by Belgium, France, West Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. Europa: The EU at
a Glance: History of the European Union, http://europa.eu/abc/history/1957/index_en.htm (last
visited Nov. 12, 2006). Today, the E.C. is made up of 25 democratic nations. See Europa: The
EU at a Glance: European Governments On-Line, http://europa.eu/abc/governments/
index_en.htm (last visited Nov. 12, 2006).
25. European Community v. R.J.R. Nabisco, Inc., 355 F.3d 123, 128–29 (2d Cir. 2004).
26. Id.
27. European Community v. R.J.R. Nabisco, Inc., 424 F.3d 175, 181 (2d Cir. 2005).
28. See id.; see also Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 448 (1964)
(White, J., dissenting on other grounds) (“[O]ur courts customarily refuse to enforce the revenue
and penal laws of a foreign state, since no country has an obligation to further the governmental
interests of a foreign sovereign”).
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sovereignty concerns were overstated. The separation of powers concerns
were minimized by the fact that the suit would have furthered the political
branches’ avowed policies of assisting other nations in eradicating organized
crime and terrorism. Furthermore, the Second Circuit mischaracterized the
claim as the extraterritorial application of foreign tax law and therefore
overstated the national sovereignty concerns raised by the suit. Because the
suit only incidentally recognized foreign tax law, the court erred in concluding
that the courts of one independent sovereign were being used to further the
policy of a foreign sovereign. Finally, this Note will show that the scope of the
revenue rule should be reduced in the civil RICO context because the doctrine
is an anachronism in today’s global economy.
Composed of five parts, this Note examines the revenue rule doctrine and
the Second Circuit’s decisions in European Community I and II. Part I delves
into the common law origins of the revenue rule. Focusing primarily on Judge
Learned Hand’s enunciation of the doctrine in Moore v. Mitchell,29 Part I also
discusses the early appearances of the revenue rule in the United States. Part II
addresses the contemporary justifications for the revenue rule that evolved out
of Judge Hand’s opinion. Part III focuses on the recent decision in
Pasquantino v. United States.30 where the Supreme Court seemed to reduce the
scope of the revenue rule by approving of a wire fraud prosecution even
though it incidentally recognized a foreign tax law.31 Part IV discusses the
reasoning of the Second Circuit in European Community I and II. Part V
provides a critical analysis of the Second Circuit’s decisions.
I. THE REVENUE RULE: COMMON LAW ORIGINS AND EARLY AMERICAN
VARIATIONS
The earliest revenue rule decisions indicate that the doctrine is a judgemade rule that has been modified depending on the dominant policy concerns
of the time.32 The revenue rule was originally justified by economic
concerns.33 More recently, the doctrine has been justified by the risk that
judicial

29. 30 F.2d 600 (2d Cir. 1929).
30. 544 U.S. 349 (2005).
31. Id.
32. See Joseph M. West, Federal Fraud Prosecutions of Schemes to Defraud Foreign
Sovereigns of Import Taxes, 50 WAYNE L. REV. 1061, 1061 (2004) (describing the revenue rule
as a prudential consideration).
33. See, e.g., Boucher v. Lawson, 95 Eng. Rep. 53 (K.B. 1734) (Lord Harwicke, C.J.).
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evaluation of policy-laden tax laws will have a negative impact on the
This section
relationship between foreign and domestic sovereigns.34
examines the evolution of the justifications for the revenue rule in the
doctrine’s first 150 years.
A.

Lord Mansfield’s Commercial Justification

The revenue rule made its first appearance in the eighteenth century in a
trio of English common law decisions.35 At that time, England was jockeying
with France for the position as the world’s superior trading power.36
“Mercantilism” was the dominant economic policy.37 In other words, the
world’s trade powers strove to create a favorable balance of exports and
imports.38 International trade was a subject of increasing taxation by most
nations.39 Some nations grew to rely on the tax revenue generated by trade;
others implemented a policy of protectionism through a combination of import
tax schemes and outright prohibition on trade with certain foreign nations.40
Thus, foreign trade and revenue laws posed a potential barrier to England and
other nations in search of commercial opportunities abroad.41
Boucher v. Lawson42 exemplifies the judicial response to the threat posed
by foreign trade laws to open markets. In an effort to conserve precious metal,
Portugal had banned the exportation of Portuguese gold in the early 1700s.43
The merchant in Boucher had formed a contract with a Portuguese carrier for
the delivery of a shipload of the protected commodity.44 After arriving in an
English port, however, the carrier refused to deliver the gold to the English
merchant.45 In response to a breach of contract suit by the merchant in a
British court, the carrier raised the Portuguese ban on gold exportation as a

34. See, e.g., Moore, 30 F.2d at 603–04 (Hand, J., concurring).
35. British Columbia v. Gilbertson, 597 F.2d 1161, 1164 (9th Cir. 1979).
36. See JOHN BOWLE, THE IMPERIAL ACHIEVEMENT: THE RISE AND TRANSFORMATION OF
THE BRITISH EMPIRE 79–82 (1974). For the British Empire, the middle part of the 18th century
marked a period of tremendous expansion in international trade. See JOHN B. OWEN, THE
EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 1714–1815 132 (1974). Between the years of 1714 and 1760, for
example, domestic exports are estimated to have increased by more than 80 percent. Id.
37. See MAURICE ASHLEY, A HISTORY OF EUROPE 1648–1815 47–48 (1973).
38. Id. at 47.
39. William S. Dodge, Breaking the Public Law Taboo, 43 HARV. INT’L. L.J. 161, 171
(2002).
40. See ASHLEY, supra note 37, at 48 (noting that nations sought to protect their own
industries and thereby increase national wealth by imposing subsidies on production and tariffs
on imports).
41. See Dodge, supra note 39, at 171.
42. 95 Eng. Rep. 53 (K.B. 1734) (Lord Harwicke, C.J.).
43. See id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
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defense.46 Because the contract was illegal according to Portuguese law, the
carrier argued, the carrier’s performance should be excused.47 The court in
Boucher refused to recognize the Portuguese law and ultimately held that the
contract was enforceable.48 As Lord Mansfield, the author of the court’s
opinion, later put it: “[N]o country ever takes notice of the revenue laws of
another.”49 This early application of the revenue rule was justified by
commercial concerns.50 Foreign law that threatened to chill English trade was
plainly disfavored in Mansfield’s court. As Boucher made clear, enforcing
oppressive duties or restrictions would have the effect of “cut[ting] off all
benefit of such trade from th[e] kingdom, which would be of very bad
consequence[s] to the principal and most beneficial branches of . . . trade.”51
The early commercial justification of the revenue rule was roundly
criticized. Early commentators found Mansfield’s commercial concerns
unprincipled and unimportant.52 Justice Joseph Story, for example, described
this reasoning as “inconsistent with good faith and moral duties of nations.”53
Later criticism has focused on the fact that the revenue rule was mere dicta in
Boucher and Holman.54 In Boucher, for instance, because the Portuguese ban
was not a revenue law per se, it has been pointed out that the revenue rule’s
prohibition on enforcement of foreign revenue law is not essential to decide the
case on its merits.55 Criticism notwithstanding, Mansfield’s decisions are
generally considered the genesis of the revenue rule.56

46. Id. at 54.
47. Boucher, 95 Eng. Rep. at 54.
48. Id.
49. Holman v. Johnson, 98 Eng. Rep. 1120, 1121 (K.B. 1775). Holman involved another
contract dispute. A French merchant had contracted to sell tea in France to an English merchant
who planned to smuggle the tea into England without paying English duties. Id. When the
French merchant sued for payment, the English merchant argued that the contract was void
because it violated English tax laws. Id. The court held that the contract was enforceable. Id.
The English law defense was unavailing because the contract was governed by French law and
French law did not recognize English tax law. Id.
50. See Dodge, supra note 39, at 170–71.
51. Boucher, 95 Eng. Rep. at 54.
52. See, e.g., JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 338–39 (8th ed.
1883) (1834).
53. Id. at 339.
54. See British Columbia v. Gilbertson, 597 F.2d 1161, 1164 (9th Cir. 1979); William J.
Kovatch, Jr., Recognizing Foreign Tax Judgments: An Argument for the Revocation of the
Revenue Rule, 22 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 265, 274–76 (Winter 2000).
55. See European Community v. R.J.R. Nabisco, Inc., 150 F.Supp.2d 456, 478–79 (E.D.N.Y.
2001).
56. See, e.g., Dodge, supra note 39, at 170.
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Judge Learned Hand’s Risk-of-Embarrassment Justification

The early revenue rule decisions in the United States applied the doctrine
on the basis that the judiciary might embarrass the political branches of
domestic and foreign governments by evaluating the tax laws of the foreign
government. Tax laws, like penal laws, are examples of positive law.57
Positive law is “a system of law promulgated and implemented within a
particular political community by political superiors.”58 Tax laws are said to
“mirror the moral and social sensibilities of a society.”59 Therefore, the courts
determined that the judicial evaluation of tax laws would risk embarrassment
of domestic or foreign policy-makers, especially where domestic policy
differed measurably from foreign policy.60
The revenue rule was first applied in the context of enforcing tax
judgments of sister states. For example, a claim by the State of Colorado to
collect a transfer tax in a New York state court was ruled impermissible as a
matter outside the court’s jurisdiction.61 Colorado’s claim violated the “wellsettled principle of private international law which precludes one state from
acting as a collector of taxes for a sister state and from enforcing its penal or
revenue laws as such.”62 In a later opinion for the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals, Judge Learned Hand provided a detailed explanation of the basis for
the revenue rule’s application in these cases.63 In assessing a claim brought
under another state’s penal or revenue laws, the domestic court must
necessarily assess the validity of that law.64 According to Judge Hand:
This is not a troublesome or delicate inquiry . . . when it concerns the relations
between the foreign state and its own citizens or even those who may be tem

57. See United States v. Boots, 80 F.3d 580, 587 (1st Cir. 1996); Roger Fisher, Bringing Law
to Bear on Governments, 74 HARV. L. REV. 1130, 1133 (1961).
58. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 925 (7th ed. 1999).
59. Att’y Gen. of Canada v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc., 268 F.3d 103, 111 (2d
Cir. 2001).
60. See Milwaukee County v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 277 (1935). For example,
suppose a foreign government imposed “a tax designed to render it very expensive to sell United
States newspapers in that nation[.]” Att’y Gen. of Canada, 268 F.3d at 113. A court evaluating
the validity of such a law would face a clear dilemma between the conflicting policies of the U.S.
Government and the particular foreign government. Id. at 112. The risk of embarrassment is
therefore credible in such a situation. Id.
61. Colorado v. Harbeck, 133 N.E. 357 (N.Y. 1921).
62. Id. at 360; see also Maryland v. Turner, 132 N.Y.S. 173, 175–76 (Sup. Ct. 1911); Detroit
v. Proctor, 61 A.2d 412, 415 (Super. Ct. 1948); Arkansas v. Bowen, 20 D.C. 291, 295–96 (Sup.
Ct. 1891); In re Bliss’ Estate, 202 N.Y.S. Supp. 185, 187 (N.Y. Sur. 1923). But cf. Henry v.
Sargeant, 13 N.H. 321 (1843) (asserting that New Hampshire state court has jurisdiction over a
claim for Vermont taxes).
63. Moore v. Mitchell, 30 F.2d 600, 603–04 (Hand, J., concurring).
64. Id. at 604.
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porarily within its borders. To pass upon the provisions of the public order of
another state is, or at any rate should be, beyond the powers of a court; it
involves the relations between the states themselves, with which courts are
incompetent to deal, and which are intrusted to other authorities. It may
commit the domestic state to a position which would seriously embarrass its
65
neighbor.

Thus, by preventing one state from assessing the policy of another state, the
revenue rule was thought to preserve relations among the states.
Judge Hand’s opinion, drafted in 1929, was likely founded on a respect for
state sovereignty. At that time, state borders were considerably more opaque
than they are today.66 Preserving state sovereignty was a particularly
important concern for many in the aftermath of the Civil War.67 Judicial
opinions from the era suggest the courts attempted to preserve this sovereignty
in the face of a unifying national economy.68 In this context, there was a
credible risk of embarrassment when the courts of one state evaluated the
positive laws of another state.69
Within a decade of Judge Hand’s opinion, however, the Supreme Court
began to reassess the balance between the principles of state sovereignty and
comity.70 The Court effectively reduced the scope of the revenue rule in the
context of tax judgments between the states in Milwaukee County v. M.E.
White Co.71 The Court held that the Full Faith and Credit Clause72 required
states to recognize the tax laws of other states.73 The Court doubted that the
policies of one state would differ dramatically from the policies of another
state.74 Therefore, there was little risk that one state court’s decision would
embarrass the policy-makers of another state.75 Despite the reduction of the

65. Id.
66. See Steven G. Gey, The Myth of State Sovereignty, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 1601, 1605 (2002).
67. See id. at 1606.
68. See, e.g., Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 273 (1918).
69. For example, consider that this was the beginning of an era in which state sovereignty
was exemplified by Southern states’ expressed vehemence towards federal attempts to eradicate
Jim Crow laws. See Gey, supra note 66, at 1606.
70. See, e.g., H. Geoffrey Moulton, Jr., The Quixotic Search for a Judicially Enforceable
Federalism, 83 MINN. L. REV. 849, 855 (“The question for the Court had become not whether
Congress had impinged on state sovereignty, but only whether congressional action was within
the scope of federal power.”).
71. 296 U.S. 268 (1935).
72. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (“[F]ull Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the
public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State.”).
73. Milwaukee County, 296 U.S. at 276.
74. Id.
75. Id.
The very purpose of the full-faith and credit clause was to alter the status of the several
states as independent foreign sovereignties, each free to ignore obligations created under
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doctrine in the context of sister state tax judgments, however, the revenue rule
could not be totally abandoned. A foreign sovereign could not rely on the
constitutional argument to enforce a foreign tax judgment in a U.S. court
because “there is no provision similar to the full faith and credit clause in the
Constitution which would require that the courts of this country extend full
faith and credit to the judgments of a foreign country.”76
These early decisions suggest the revenue rule is an elastic doctrine that
can be stretched or constricted in accordance with contemporary policy
preferences. Lord Mansfield recognized that English trade in the eighteenth
century would benefit from prudent application of the revenue rule.77
Similarly, the policy and constitutional arguments employed in the revenue
rule cases in the United States in the 1920s and 1930s embody the thencontemporary notion of the opacity of state borders.
II. CONTEMPORARY JUSTIFICATIONS
Judge Hand’s risk-of-embarrassment justification for the revenue rule was
eventually restated as three distinct but related justifications. They are: (1) the
principal concern that enforcement of foreign tax law violates separation of
powers; (2) the concern that use of domestic courts for foreign tax issues
offends our sense of national sovereignty; and (3) the concern that domestic
courts are not competent to interpret foreign tax law issues.78 This section will
examine each of these justifications in turn.
A.

Separation of Powers Concerns

The separation of powers principle is fundamental to the Constitution’s
framework.79 The Constitution delegates several duties with respect to foreign

the laws or by the judicial proceedings of the others, and to make them integral parts of a
single nation throughout which a remedy upon a just obligation might be demanded as of
right, irrespective of the state of origin.
Id. at 276–77.
76. British Columbia v. Gilbertson, 597 F.2d 1161, 1164–65 n.8 (9th Cir. 1979).
77. Boucher v. Lawson, 95 Eng. Rep. 53 (K.B. 1734) (Lord Harwicke, C.J.).
78. Bradley R. Wilson, Subtle Indiscretions? International Smuggling, Federal Criminal
Law, and the Revenue Rule, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 231, 240 (Nov. 2003); see also Pasquantino v.
United States, 544 U.S. 349, 370 (2005).
79. See Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 341 (2000) (“The Constitution enumerates and
separates the powers of the three branches of Government in Articles I, II, and III, and it is this
‘very structure’ of the Constitution that exemplifies the concept of separation of powers.”)
(quoting INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 946 (1983)).
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affairs exclusively to the executive branch.80 These duties include the power to
make treaties and the power to appoint ambassadors.81 These duties are
thought to be vested in the executive so that the government may present a
unified face to the international community.82 Additionally, as a singular
entity, the executive is thought to be better able to respond to international
events demanding quick and efficient action than a legislative or judicial
body.83 Because foreign policy matters are delegated to the executive branch,
the judiciary is barred by the separation of powers principle from deciding
cases involving a large measure of foreign policy.84
In the revenue rule context, courts have concluded that separation of
powers concerns are present where a claim involves direct enforcement of a
foreign tax law and the executive branch has no involvement in the case.85
United States v. Boots86 is an example of a revenue rule case that was decided
largely on separation of powers grounds.87 The First Circuit Court of Appeals
held that the revenue rule barred the federal wire fraud prosecution of U.S.
citizens charged with violating foreign tax laws.88 The court was particularly
concerned with the risk that “[n]ational policy judgments” might be
“undermined” if the court were to give general effect to the foreign tax laws at
issue in the prosecution.89

80. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2; United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319
(1936) (“[T]he President alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative of the
nation.”).
81. U.S. CONST. art. II, §§ 1–2.
82. See Curtiss-Wright Export, 299 U.S. at 320 (stressing the “very delicate, plenary and
exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of
international relations”). Compare Curtis A. Bradley & Martin S. Flaherty, Executive Power
Essentialism and Foreign Affairs, 102 MICH. L. REV. 545, 579–80 (2004) (arguing that Executive
power did not originally include plenary foreign affairs duties), with Saikrishna B. Prakash &
Michael D. Ramsey, Foreign Affairs and the Jeffersonian Executive: A Defense, 89 MINN. L.
REV. 1591, 1685 (2005) (explaining that foreign affairs duties were assigned to the Executive for
the simple reason that the prevalent understanding in the eighteenth century of the Executive
power included these duties).
83. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 580 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“The
Founders intended that the President have primary responsibility—along with the necessary
power—to protect the national security and to conduct the Nation’s foreign relations. They did so
principally because the structural advantages of a unitary Executive are essential in these
domains.”).
84. See Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111
(1948) (“[T]he very nature of executive decisions as to foreign policy is political, not judicial.”).
85. See, e.g., Att’y Gen. of Canada v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc., 268 F.3d 103
(2d Cir. 2001).
86. 80 F.3d 580 (1st Cir. 1996).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 588.
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Other courts have held, however, that direct executive branch involvement
in the case will diminish separation of powers concerns. The Executive is
directly involved in a case, for example, where the federal government
prosecutes a defendant under a domestic statute.90 The federal prosecutor is
after all considered an organ of the executive branch.91 According to the
Supreme Court, “by electing to bring [a] prosecution, the Executive has
assessed the prosecution’s impact on” foreign policy and has “concluded that it
poses little danger of causing international friction.”92 Hence, contrary to
Boots, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that a wire fraud
prosecution based on violations of foreign tax law did not implicate separation
of powers concerns because the Congress and the Executive were directly
involved in the case.93 The court noted, “Congress enacted the wire fraud
statute and the United States Attorney, acting on behalf of the United States as
directed by the Executive Branch, made the decision to seek the Defendants’
indictment thereunder.”94 In fact, according to the court, “a significant
separation of powers problem would arise were [the court] to play diplomat
from the bench by relying on a novel expansion of the common law revenue
rule, no doubt a policy laden rule,” to bar the government’s wire fraud
prosecution.95 The court further reasoned that even if the prosecution involves
some degree of interpretation of foreign tax law, the enforcement of a domestic
statute should be characterized as the vindication of a domestic law
enforcement interest rather than as the enforcement of a foreign tax law.96
Although the separation of powers principle is central to the constitutional
framework, the branches of government are not definitively
compartmentalized.97 There exists a permissible measure of overlap among
the separate branches.98 For example, the Executive may employ the treaty
power as a mechanism to authorize another branch of government to perform a

90. Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349, 364 (2005).
91. Id. at 369.
92. Id.
93. United States v. Pasquantino, 336 F.3d 321, 331 (4th Cir. 2003).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 330–31.
97. See Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 341 (2000) (noting that the “boundaries between the
three branches are not ‘“hermetically” sealed’”) (quoting INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951
(1983)); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 388 (1989) (“[C]onsistent with the separation
of powers, Congress may delegate to the Judicial Branch nonadjudicatory functions that do not
trench upon the prerogatives of another Branch and that are appropriate to the central mission of
the Judiciary.”).
98. See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 380.
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duty that impacts foreign policy.99 Therefore, courts have acknowledged the
absence of separation of powers concerns where the United States has entered
into a treaty that calls for the enforcement of foreign tax judgments.100 In
Gilbertson, the Canadian Province of British Columbia sued in United States
federal district court to recover on a judgment for tax revenue originally
awarded by a Canadian court.101 In holding that the revenue rule barred the
claim, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals noted that Canada and the United
States were parties to two extensive tax treaties.102 The treaties each provided
that the governments will exchange information when needed in order to
curtail international tax evasion.103 However, the treaties did not provide for
reciprocal enforcement powers.104 The court noted, “[e]ven though the
political branches of the two countries could have abolished the revenue rule
between themselves at the time they entered into the treaties, they did not.”105
Therefore, without evidence of executive or legislative consent, enforcement of
a foreign tax judgment would implicate the separation of powers concerns of
the revenue rule.106
In sum, in the absence of evidence of consent from the political branches
of government, enforcement of a foreign tax judgment would implicate the
separation of powers concerns of the revenue rule. Evidence of sufficient
consent has been found where the executive branch is involved directly in the
case by prosecuting a U.S. citizen under a domestic statute. 107 Evidence of
sufficient consent will also probably be found where the claim or prosecution
is brought under the terms of a valid treaty.108

99. See, e.g., United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 201 (2004) (“[T]reaties made pursuant to
[the treaty] power can authorize Congress to deal with ‘matters’ with which otherwise ‘Congress
could not deal.’”) (quoting Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920)).
100. See Att’y Gen. of Canada v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc., 268 F.3d 103, 116
(2d Cir. 2001).
101. British Columbia v. Gilbertson, 597 F.2d 1161, 1162 (9th Cir. 1979).
102. Id. at 1165–66.
103. Id. at 1165.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. See also Republic of Honduras v. Philip Morris Cos., Inc., 341 F.3d 1253, 1259 (11th
Cir. 2003) (holding that the revenue rule barred the Republic’s suit to recover tax revenue
because “[t]he political branches undisputedly have not entered into any type of tax treaty with
any of the Republics that would allow the Republics to enforce their tax claims underlying this
suit in this country.”); Att’y Gen. of Canada v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc., 268 F.3d
103, 119–22 (2d Cir. 2001) (discussing at length the U.S.–Canada Treaty Framework).
107. European Cmty. v. R.J.R. Nabisco, Inc., 424 F.3d 175, 180–81 (2d Cir. 2005).
108. See Gilbertson, 597 F.2d at 1162–65.
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National Sovereignty Concerns

The revenue rule is also occasionally justified by a respect for national
sovereignty.109 That is, “the rule prevents sovereigns from asserting their
sovereignty within the borders of other nations, thereby helping nations
maintain their mutual respect and security.”110 The national sovereignty
justification is as old as the revenue rule itself. The respect for national
sovereignty can be gleaned from Lord Mansfield’s earliest enunciations of the
revenue rule: “[N]o country ever takes notice of the revenue laws of
another.”111
In holding that the revenue rule barred foreign governments from bringing
a civil RICO claim based on foreign tax evasion, the court in Attorney General
of Canada reasoned that the suit would allow for the extraterritorial application
of foreign tax law.112 According to the court:
[T]he class of laws which will be enforced are those laws which are an
exercise by the sovereign government of its sovereign authority over property
within its territory or over its subjects wherever they may be. But other laws
will not be enforced. By international law every sovereign state has no
sovereignty beyond its own frontiers. The courts of other countries will not
allow it to go beyond the bounds. They will not enforce any of its laws which
113
purport to exercise sovereignty beyond the limits of its authority.

According to this formulation, the court’s responsibilities include protecting
domestic sovereignty against the assault of an extraterritorial application of
foreign tax law.114
C. Judicial Competence
A final, less common justification given for the revenue rule is that U.S.
courts lack competence to interpret foreign tax law issues. Competence to
interpret foreign tax law issues involves the pragmatic consideration of the
complexity of the law at issue. Judicial competence concerns arise in cases
involving foreign tax law because one party will necessarily argue that the
foreign tax law was not violated, that the foreign tax law does not apply to the
case at hand, or that the foreign tax law is invalid.115 Any of these arguments
will require the domestic court to “effectively pass[ ] on the validity and
109. See, e.g., Att’y Gen. of Canada, 268 F.3d at 111–12.
110. Id. at 111; see also Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 448 (1964)
(White, J., dissenting on other grounds).
111. Holman v. Johnson, 98 Eng. Rep. 1120, 1121 (K.B. 1775).
112. Att’y Gen. of Canada, 268 F.3d at 106.
113. Id. at 111 n.6 (quoting Att’y Gen. of N.Z. v. Ortiz, [1984] A.C. 1 (H.L.)).
114. See id. at 112 (“[W]e will not permit the presence in our country of foreign tax men,
even if represented by intermediaries; we do not tolerate that any help may be given to them”)
(quoting QRS 1 APS v. Frandsen, [1999] 3 All E.R. 289, 294–97 (C.A. 1999)).
115. Wilson, supra note 78, at 256.
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operation of the revenue laws of a foreign country, [thereby implicating] the
important concerns underlying the revenue rule.”116
Domestic judges are not trained to interpret foreign tax law. It might be
said, domestic judges are “naïve as to the laws of other nations.”117 Regarding
the difficulty of interpreting foreign tax laws, it has been noted:
[T]here is the difficulty of applying foreign tax law correctly. A mature tax
system is likely to be a very intricate network of rules, regulations, and
accounting practices administered by a special bureaucracy under judicial
supervision by a separate tax court hierarchy, aided by a specialized tax bar
and accounting profession. The even-handed application of such a body of law
118
by a foreign court of general jurisdiction is, to say the last, not easy.

This argument is bolstered when one considers the complexity of our own
Internal Revenue Code.119 It has also been pointed out that the difficulty of
discovery of evidence in a complicated tax claim will be compounded by the
fact that the events at issue occurred in a foreign country, far from where the
trial is held.120 The judicial competence justification therefore implies that a
domestic court should refuse to preside over a foreign tax claim involving
complex foreign tax issues in fairness to the litigants in a particular case.
III. PASQUANTINO: A NARROW READING OF THE REVENUE RULE
The contemporary justifications were examined and applied in the
Supreme Court’s most recent revenue rule decision. In Pasquantino, the
Supreme Court resolved a circuit split that had developed over the question
whether the revenue rule bars a federal wire fraud prosecution based on foreign
tax evasion.121 Pasquantino therefore provides the framework for resolving
“mixed” questions of law involving a domestic statute and a foreign tax law.122
In a 5–4 majority decision penned by Justice Thomas, the Court held that the
revenue rule did not bar a federal wire fraud prosecution because such a
prosecution only incidentally recognizes a foreign tax law while directly
enforcing a domestic statute.123

116. United States v. Boots, 80 F.3d 580, 587 (1st Cir. 1996).
117. Wilson, supra note 78, at 240.
118. Hans W. Baade, The Operation of Foreign Public Law, 30 TEX. INT’L L.J. 429, 483
(1995).
119. See, e.g., Alexander v. Everson, Slip Copy, 2005 WL 2035041 (D. Kan. Apr. 23, 2004)
(noting the complexities of the Internal Revenue Code in refusing to impose sanctions on a pro se
litigant in a tax related claim).
120. Dodge, supra note 39, at 209–10.
121. Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349, 354 (2005).
122. See id. Pasquantino also represents the Court’s latest revenue rule decision. The
revenue rule was last essential to the holding of a Supreme Court decision in 1935 in Milwaukee
County v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268 (1935).
123. Pasquantino, 544 U.S. at 354–55.
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Pasquantino involved a federal prosecution under the federal wire fraud
statute.124 The federal wire fraud statute criminalizes the interstate use of
wires, radio, or television communications for the purposes of executing any
scheme or artifice to defraud.125 The phrase “scheme to defraud” is broadly
construed.126 For example, each telephone or radio communication constitutes
a separate offense under the wire fraud statute even though all of the
communications together are part of a single fraudulent scheme.127
The government charged the Pasquantinos and an accomplice, Arthur
Hilts, with wire fraud for their participation in a scheme to smuggle liquor into
According to the
Canada without paying Canadian excise taxes.128
prosecution, the Pasquantinos had placed several phone calls from their homes
in New York to liquor retailers located in Maryland.129 Hilts and other drivers
were then employed to transport the liquor across the Canadian border while
concealing the contents of each shipment from Canadian customs officials.130
Following their arrest, the Pasquantinos and Hilts were charged with and
eventually convicted of several federal wire fraud statute violations.131 The
defendants argued on appeal that the revenue rule barred the prosecution
because the case required the court to interpret Canadian tax law.132 The
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction on the basis that the
revenue rule did not apply because the prosecution amounted to the direct
enforcement of a domestic statute.133
The First and Second Circuit Courts of Appeals had split over the question
of whether the revenue rule applied to a prosecution like the one in
Pasquantino.134 On similar facts,135 the First Circuit Court of Appeals in Boots
124. Id. at 353; 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2000).
125. § 1343.
126. See Ellen M. Faro, Note, Telemarketing Credit Card Fraud: Is RICO One Answer?,
1990 U. ILL. L. REV. 675, 694 n.195 (1990) (explaining that the broad construction of the wire
fraud statute prevailed in the nineteenth century based on the notions that “use of the mails was a
privilege available only to the ‘most high-minded’” and the purpose of the statute was to prevent
the perversion of the Nation’s mail and wire systems).
127. See, e.g., United States v. Calvert, 523 F.2d 895, 914 (8th Cir. 1975) (noting that each
use of the wires is a separate offense under the wire fraud statute even though all may be part of a
single fraudulent scheme).
128. Pasquantino, 544 U.S. at 353.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 354.
133. United States v. Pasquantino, 336 F.3d 321, 327–31 (4th Cir. 2003).
134. Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349, 354 (2005); see United States v. Trapilo,
130 F.3d 547 (2d Cir. 1997); United States v. Boots, 80 F.3d 580 (1st Cir. 1996).
135. Boots involved a federal wire fraud prosecution for a scheme to smuggle cigarettes
across the Canadian border using a Native American reservation that straddled the border as a
conduit. Boots, 80 F.3d at 583.
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held that the revenue rule barred the government from prosecuting the
defendants.136 Because the prosecution required the court to take cognizance
of Canadian tax law, the Boots court was concerned that the case would allow
the judiciary to interfere and undermine “the legislative and executive
branches’ exercise of their foreign policymaking powers.”137 The Second
Circuit Court of Appeals in Trapilo concluded to the contrary, holding that the
revenue rule did not bar such prosecutions.138 According to the Trapilo court,
these wire fraud prosecutions did not implicate separation of powers concerns
at all.139 No interpretation of foreign tax law was required.140 Rather,
according to Trapilo, the Government’s prosecution only required the court to
determine whether the federal wire fraud statute was violated, that is, whether
the defendants possessed the intent to defraud the Canadian government of tax
revenue.141
In resolving the split, the Court sided with the Trapilo conclusion that the
revenue rule did not bar federal wire fraud prosecutions of a scheme to evade
foreign taxes.142 Central to the Court’s holding was the characterization of the
wire fraud prosecution as the direct enforcement of a domestic statute.143 The
defendants had argued that the collection of Canadian taxes was the primary
object of the prosecution because the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of
1996144 requires an award of restitution of lost tax revenue to the Canadian
government.145 The Court reasoned, however, that “the wire fraud statute
advances the Federal Government’s independent interest in punishing
fraudulent domestic criminal conduct,” viz., fraudulent use of interstate
wires.146 Though requiring the Court to incidentally recognize foreign tax law,

136. Id. at 588-89.
137. Id. at 587–88.
138. Trapilo, 130 F.3d at 549. Trapilo involved a federal wire fraud prosecution for a scheme
nearly identical to the one in Boots: the defendants manufactured a scheme in which liquor and
cigarettes would be smuggled across the Canadian border through another Native American
reservation straddling the Canadian border. Id.
139. Id. at 552–53.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 552.
142. See Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349, 354–53 (2005). Justice Ginsburg’s
dissenting opinion, joined by three other Justices, argued that the revenue rule applied because the
prosecution primarily amounted to the direct enforcement of foreign tax law. Id. at 372, 376–77
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Ginsburg focused on the fact that under prevailing sentencing
guidelines the defendants’ sentences were to be determined by a calculation of the damage
inflicted by the wire fraud scheme, that is, by a calculation of the amount of foreign tax revenue
lost to the scheme. Id.
143. See id. at 362.
144. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663A–64 (2000).
145. Pasquantino, 544 U.S. at 364.
146. Id. at 365.
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the case ultimately involved “a domestic sovereign acting pursuant to authority
conferred by a criminal statute.”147
The Court concluded that the justifications for the revenue rule were not
triggered by federal wire fraud prosecutions of schemes to evade foreign
taxes.148 Separation of powers concerns were not implicated by the
prosecution because the political branches were involved in the case.149
According to the Court’s characterization of the prosecution: “This action was
brought by the Executive to enforce a statute passed by Congress.”150 Nothing
in the wire fraud statute or the statute’s legislative history suggests that
Congress intended to exempt these sorts of cases from wire fraud
prosecutions.151 Furthermore, because this case was brought by the federal
government, it could be assumed that the executive branch “has assessed this
prosecution’s impact on this Nation’s relationship with Canada, and concluded
that it poses little danger of causing international friction.”152
National sovereignty concerns were not implicated because the prosecution
did not involve the extraterritorial enforcement of foreign tax law.153 The
prosecution primarily amounted to the direct enforcement of a domestic
criminal statute which merely recognized a foreign tax law.154 The prosecution
represents the “policy choice of the two political branches of our
Government—Congress and the Executive—to free the interstate wires from
fraudulent use, irrespective of the object of the fraud.”155 The Court expressed
mild bewilderment as to why the Government might wish to divert resources to
prosecute a scheme in which another government was the victim.156
Nevertheless, the Court was convinced that the prosecution’s primary objective
was the vindication of domestic law enforcement interests.157
Finally, judicial competence concerns were not implicated because the
case raised no complicated foreign tax issues.158 The case focused on the
question of whether the Pasquantinos possessed the intent to violate foreign tax
law, not on whether the foreign tax law was actually violated.159 The question
of whether the scheme would indeed violate foreign tax law was resolved by

147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

Id. at 364.
Id. at 368.
Id. at 369.
Pasquantino, 544 U.S. at 369.
Id. at 354–60.
Id. at 369.
Id. at 371.
Id.
Pasquantino, 544 U.S. at 370.
Id. at 372.
See id. at 371–72.
Id. at 370.
See id.
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the presentation of the testimony of a government witness.160 A provision of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure161 provides that a court may consider
such testimony in interpreting matters of foreign law.162
The Pasquantino decision therefore adopted the Trapilo court’s narrow
reading of the revenue rule in wire fraud cases. In cases where the political
branches are directly involved, foreign policy-related concerns are absent and
the revenue rule will not apply. The Court’s decision also makes clear the
importance of characterization in the revenue rule analysis, especially in those
cases involving equal parts domestic and foreign law. Thus, the revenue rule
will not apply where, as in Pasquantino, the prosecution or claim primarily
vindicates domestic interests, even though such a prosecution or claim
incidentally furthers foreign interests.
IV. CIVIL RICO AND THE REVENUE RULE IN THE SECOND CIRCUIT
In a footnote, the Pasquantino Court expressly refused to decide “whether
a foreign government, based on wire or mail fraud predicate offenses, may
bring a civil action under [RICO] for a scheme to defraud it of taxes.”163
Foreign governments had already attempted to sue cigarette-makers under the
civil provisions of RICO alleging foreign tax evasion.164 In Attorney General
of Canada and European Community I, each decided prior to Pasquantino, the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals had held that the revenue rule bars such
claims.165 The Supreme Court vacated and remanded166 European Community
I to the Second Circuit for “reconsideration in light of its decision in
Pasquantino.”167 After providing an overview of civil RICO, this section
outlines the reasoning of the Second Circuit’s revenue rule analyses in
Attorney General of Canada, European Community I, and European
Community II.

160. See Pasquantino, 544 U.S. at 370.
161. FED. R. CRIM. P. 26.1.
162. See id.; Pasquantino, 544 U.S. at 370.
163. Pasquantino, 544 U.S. at 355 n.1.
164. See, e.g., Att’y Gen. of Canada v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc., 268 F.3d 103
(2d Cir. 2001).
165. See id. at 134–35; European Cmty. v. R.J.R. Nabisco, Inc. (European Cmty. I), 355 F.3d
123, 139 (2d Cir. 2004).
166. European Cmty. v. R.J.R. Nabisco, Inc., 544 U.S. 1012 (2005).
167. European Cmty. v. R.J.R. Nabisco, Inc. (European Cmty. II), 424 F.3d 175, 177 (2d Cir.
2005).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2006]

A.

“A DELICATE INQUIRY”

221

Civil RICO

RICO was originally enacted for the purpose of combating organized
crime.168 The elements of a RICO offense are: (1) the commission of a
predicate act; (2) direct or indirect involvement in an enterprise; and (3) the
enterprise affects interstate or foreign commerce.169 A wire fraud offense is an
example of a RICO “predicate act.”170 Like the federal wire fraud statute, the
provisions of RICO are broadly construed to encompass a wide range of
conduct.171 Congress expressly provided that “[t]he provisions of [RICO] shall
be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes.”172 Thus, in Sedima,
S.P.R.L. v. Imrex, the Court rejected attempts to restrict the reach of civil RICO
by holding that a defendant need not be prosecuted by the government and
convicted of a predicate act before a plaintiff can bring a civil RICO claim.173

168. Michele Sacks et al., Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations, 42 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 825, 826 (2005).
169. Id. at 828.
170. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (2000); see, e.g., Bank of China, N.Y. Branch v. NBM LLC, 125
S.Ct. 2956 (2005).
171. Compare Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc., 473 U.S. 479, 526 (1985) (Powell, J.,
dissenting) (“RICO has been interpreted so broadly that it has been used more often against
respected businesses with no ties to organized crime, than against the mobsters who were the
clearly intended target of the statute.”), with La. Power and Light Co. v. United Gas Pipe Line
Co., 642 F.Supp. 781, 802 (E.D. La. 1986) (“[T]he crimes of mail and wire fraud are broad in
scope, and the interpretation given them must be flexible enough to encompass any conduct
falling below the mark of fair play and right dealing.”). James P. Kennedy notes:
[The] broad statutory language coupled with the lure of treble damages and attorneys’
fees, has made civil RICO actions very attractive to plaintiffs in a myriad of commercial
litigation cases. . . . Included within [the] predicate acts [for a RICO claim or prosecution]
are mail fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1341) and wire fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1343), the broadest
criminal statutes in the federal code.
James P. Kennedy, Civil RICO in the Antitrust Context, 55 ANTITRUST 463, 463–65 (1986). See
also Daniel Z. Herbst, Comment, Injunctive Relief and Civil RICO: After Scheidler v. National
Organization for Women, Inc., RICO’s Scope and Remedies Require Reevaluation, 53 CATH. U.
L. REV. 1125, 1125–26 (2004) (describing the explosion of civil RICO litigation in the 1980s, due
in part to a broad construction of the civil RICO provisions along with an equally broad
construction of the predicate wire fraud activity provisions); Jerry J. Phillips, Thinking, 72 TENN.
L. REV. 697, 726 (2005) (“Many feel that Congress cast the net of civil RICO much more broadly
than intended or desirable, snaring bankers and lawyers and accountants as well as the Mafia—
especially under the mail and wire fraud predicate acts.”).
172. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84
Stat. 941, 947 (1970); see Bankers Trust Co. v. Rhoades, 859 F.2d 1096, 1100–01 (2d Cir. 1988)
(deferring to congressional instructions to liberally construe the civil RICO provisions and
holding that lower court erred when it applied an additional standing requirement to the plaintiffs’
claim).
173. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 524; see also Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc.,
483 U.S. 143, 149–50 (1987) (identifying numerous offenses that qualify as “racketeering
activity” within the meaning of RICO).
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RICO provides a private cause of action to parties injured by conduct
amounting to a violation of the statute.174 “To establish a [civil] RICO claim, a
plaintiff must show: ‘(1) a violation of the RICO statute . . . ; (2) an injury to
business or property; and (3) that the injury was caused by the violation of
[RICO].”175 A plaintiff who prevails on a civil RICO claim is entitled to treble
damages, filing costs, and attorney’s fees.176 RICO violations often involve
complex schemes that test the limits of law enforcement capabilities and
resources.177 Consequently, one purpose of RICO’s civil enforcement scheme
has been to provide much-needed assistance to federal and state law
enforcement agencies.178
Few law enforcement provisions were left untouched by the legislation
enacted in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and RICO is
no exception. RICO was amended to include terrorism-related offenses and
predicate acts by the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001
(the Patriot Act).179 RICO predicate acts now include money laundering
crimes against foreign nations and financial schemes that might aid terrorist
groups.180
By expanding the already broad reach of civil RICO, it has been posited
that Congress intended to further reduce the scope of the revenue rule.181
Specifically, it has been argued that Congress intended to reduce the scope of
the revenue rule in cases brought by foreign governments under civil RICO
against U.S. cigarette-makers for foreign tax evasion.182 The proponents of
this argument point to the legislative history of the Patriot Act amendment.183
First, the original version of the Patriot Act amendment to RICO included a
“rule of construction,” a provision pertaining to civil RICO claims and foreign
tax laws.184 According to that original version:
None of the changes or amendments made by the Financial Anti-Terrorism Act
of 2001 shall expand the jurisdiction of any Federal or State court over any
civil action or claim for monetary damages for the nonpayment of taxes or
174. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2000).
175. De Falco v. Bernas, 244 F.3d 286, 305 (2d Cir. 2001).
176. § 1964(c).
177. See Brief of the Federal Law Enforcement Officers Ass’n as Amicus Curiae in Support
of the Position of the European Community and Member States, and the Reversal of the
Judgment of the District Court at 2, European Cmty. v. R.J.R. Nabisco, Inc., 424 F.3d 175 (2d
Cir. 2005) (Nos. 02-7330, 02-7325), 2002 WL 32443238 [hereinafter Brief for FLEOA].
178. A.J. Cunningham Packing Corp. v. Cong. Fin. Corp., 792 F.2d 330, 340 (3d Cir. 1986).
179. See Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 382 (2001).
180. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7) (2000).
181. See European Cmty. I, 355 F.3d 123, 133 (2d Cir. 2004).
182. Id. at 132–33.
183. See id. at 133–34.
184. Financial Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001, H.R. 3004, 107th Cong. § 106(b) (2001).
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duties under the revenue laws of a foreign state, or any political subdivision
thereof, except as such actions or claims are authorized by [a] United States
treaty that provides the United States and its political subdivisions with
reciprocal rights to pursue such actions or claims in the courts of the foreign
185
state and its political subdivisions.

This provision, which would have clearly exempted cigarette-makers from
foreign tax claims brought by most foreign governments, was conspicuously
deleted from the final version of the Patriot Act.186 Second, it has been argued
that the section-by-section analyses of the Patriot Act and accompanying
legislators’ comments indicate that the deletion effectively exposed U.S.
cigarette-makers to potential liability under the civil RICO provisions.187 For
example, the section-by-section analyses presented to and approved by both
Houses of Congress expressly note that the deletion “dropped [the exemption
for] tobacco companies from RICO liability for foreign excise taxes.”188
B.

Attorney General of Canada

The Second Circuit’s first civil RICO case involving the revenue rule
concerned a suit brought by the Attorney General of Canada against cigarette
maker R.J. Reynolds and several of its North American subsidiaries.189
Canada’s suit alleged that the defendants had engaged in a complicated scheme
to avoid the Canadian import tax on cigarettes.190 In perpetrating the
smuggling scheme, the defendants had employed the U.S. mails and wires in
various transactions.191 Therefore, the defendants had committed the RICO
predicate act of wire fraud.192 Canada brought suit against the defendants
under the civil enforcement provisions of RICO alleging a conspiracy to

185. Id.
186. European Cmty. I, 355 F.3d at 134.
187. See 147 Cong. Rec. 15, 20872 (daily ed. Oct. 29, 2001) (statement of Rep. Wexler) (“I
am pleased that a provision earlier included . . . which would have inhibited RICO liability for
foreign excise taxes for tobacco companies, has been dropped from the USA PATRIOT Act.”);
id. at 20710 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 2001) (statement of Sen. Kerry) (“[I]t is the intent of the
legislature that our allies will have access to our courts and the use of our laws if they are the
victims of smuggling, fraud, money laundering, or terrorism.”); 147 Cong. Rec. 14, 20447 (daily
ed. Oct. 23, 2001) (statement of Rep. Conyers) (“I am very proud . . . [that] we dropped the
administration proposal that would have . . . prevented RICO liability for tobacco companies.”).
188. European Cmty. I, 355 F.3d at 134.
189. Att’y Gen. of Canada v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc., 268 F.3d 103, 105–06
(2d. Cir. 2001).
190. See id. at 105.
191. See id. at 107.
192. See id.
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defraud the Canadian government of tax revenue.193 Canada sought restitution
and law enforcement fees.194
In Attorney General of Canada, the Second Circuit affirmed the lower
court’s decision that the revenue rule barred Canada’s suit.195 The court
characterized Canada’s civil RICO claim as a “request for extraterritorial tax
enforcement by a foreign sovereign.”196 The court distinguished its own
decision in Trapilo, where it had held that the revenue rule did not bar a federal
wire fraud prosecution of a scheme to violate foreign tax law, by focusing on
the identity of the plaintiff.197 “[T]here is a critical difference between this
civil suit brought by a foreign sovereign and the criminal actions previously
considered by [the court in Trapilo].”198 Because the executive branch brought
the suit in Trapilo, the separation of powers concerns were absent.199 In
Attorney General of Canada, however, the Executive was not involved in
Canada’s civil RICO claim.200 Therefore, according to the court, the foreign
policy-related justifications of the revenue rule, particularly the separation of
powers concerns, were implicated by the civil RICO claim.201
C. European Community I: Civil RICO, the Revenue Rule, and the Patriot
Act
The Second Circuit decided Attorney General of Canada before the Patriot
Act amendments to RICO were enacted. In European Community I, the
Second Circuit considered another civil RICO claim brought by a foreign
government against U.S. cigarette-makers.202 In holding that the revenue rule
barred the foreign government’s suit, the court repeated much of its reasoning
from Attorney General of Canada and rejected the argument that the Patriot
Act’s legislative history invited foreign governments to bring civil RICO
claims against cigarette-makers.203
The European Community (E.C.) alleged that the cigarette-makers were
involved in black market activities in E.C. territories designed to evade the
taxes imposed by those governments on cigarettes.204 The E.C. imposes a

193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

See id. at 107–08.
See Att’y Gen. of Canada, 268 F.3d at 105.
See id. at 106.
Id. at 124.
See id. at 123.
Id.
Att’y Gen. of Canada, 268 F.3d at 123.
See id. at 123–24.
See id. at 111–16.
See European Cmty. I, 355 F.3d 123, 127 (2d Cir. 2004).
See id. at 131–32.
See id. at 128.
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relatively high excise tax as a revenue-raising measure.205 In order to avoid
these taxes, the cigarette-makers allegedly sold to distributors who openly
admitted selling to smugglers who then illegally shipped the cigarettes into
Europe.206 The cigarette-makers’ executives allegedly enjoyed part of the
profits generated by these transactions in the form of bonuses and kickbacks.207
As a result of such black market activities, the E.C. has estimated that its
governments lose over one billion dollars in revenue per year.208 The E.C.
therefore alleged that the cigarette-makers were involved in a smuggling
scheme within the meaning of RICO and had committed the predicate act of
wire fraud in furthering the conspiracy.209 The E.C. sought the civil RICO
remedy of treble damages based on lost revenue and law enforcement costs.210
On appeal, the Second Circuit concluded that the justifications for the
revenue rule were implicated by the E.C.’s claim.211 The case presented
separation of powers concerns because neither the executive nor the legislative
branch of government was involved in the case.212 The E.C. argued that the
executive branch’s consent was implied because that branch had not expressly
opposed the suit.213 Mere “executive inaction,” however, was not enough to
overcome the court’s separation of powers concerns.214 Neutrality, in the
court’s opinion, did not amount to evidence of Executive consent.215 Instead,
Executive consent is apparent, for example, where the government has
“[brought] suit itself,” as in the wire fraud prosecution in Trapilo.216
The court was also not persuaded by the argument that the legislative
history of the Patriot Act evidenced Congressional intent to subject cigarettemakers to civil RICO claims by foreign governments.217 First, according to the
court, the Patriot Act amendments adding additional offenses to RICO in order
to expand the statute’s reach to include terrorist-related activities did not
indicate Congressional intent to do away with the revenue rule in civil RICO
cases.218 The court refused to accept the proposition that the addition of a few
205. See Daley, supra note 4.
206. See id.
207. European Cmty. I, 355 F.3d at 128.
208. Daley, supra note 4.
209. See European Cmty. I, 355 F.3d at 128.
210. See id. at 128–29.
211. See id. at 132.
212. See id. at 137.
213. See id.
214. European Cmty. I, 355 F.3d at 137.
215. See id.
216. Id. The court also acknowledged that Executive consent may be indicated by other
means, “such as submitting a statement from the State Department or filing an amicus brief.” Id.
at 132.
217. See id. at 135–36.
218. See id. at 133.
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offenses to RICO changed the entire “structure or focus” of the statute.219
Second, with respect to the deletion of the proposed rule of construction that
would have exempted cigarette-makers from civil RICO claims, the court
pointed out that the deleted provision was a proposed rule of construction for
the Patriot Act and not a part of the legislative history of RICO.220 The court
refused to interpret one statute in light of the legislative history of another
statute.221 In any event, the court concluded that mere deletion of a provision
does not suggest that Congress actually intended to overrule revenue rule case
law and entirely abrogate the revenue rule in all cases.222 Finally, with respect
to the statements of members of Congress who interpreted the deletion as
abrogating the revenue rule in the civil RICO context, the court doubted that
the views of only a handful of legislators represented clear evidence of
Congressional intent to open federal courts to civil RICO claims like the one
brought by the E.C.223
The Second Circuit also suggested that the national sovereignty
justification for the revenue rule was present because the claim would amount
to extraterritorial enforcement of foreign tax law.224 Again echoing Attorney
General of Canada, the court characterized the civil RICO claim as the direct
enforcement of foreign tax law.225 The E.C.’s claim was premised exclusively
on violations of foreign tax law.226 “[A]djudicating [the E.C’s claim]
would . . . requir[e] the court to evaluate the policies behind the relevant
foreign tax laws, interpret their provisions, and enforce them by awarding
damages.”227 Therefore, according to the Second Circuit’s characterization of
the claim, the sole object of the suit was to allow the E.C. to enforce its own
tax laws through the mechanism of a civil RICO claim.228
Beyond the Patriot Act amendments, nothing had changed between
Attorney General of Canada and European Community I. The facts of the
cases were nearly identical and the court concluded that it was bound by the
precedent established in Attorney General of Canada.229 The changes in civil
RICO’s legislative history were not persuasive enough to pry the court from
this precedent.

219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.

European Cmty. I, 355 F.3d at 133.
Id. at 134.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 135.
European Cmty. I, 355 F.3d at 132.
See id. at 132.
See id.
Id.
See id.
European Cmty. I, 355 F.3d at 132.
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D. European Community II: Civil RICO and the Revenue Rule ‘In Light of
Pasquantino’
The Supreme Court vacated and remanded the Second Circuit’s decision in
European Community I for reconsideration in light of the Court’s revenue rule
decision in Pasquantino.230 Upon remand, the Second Circuit in European
Community II distinguished Pasquantino and reinstated its prior decision.231
As in European Community I, the court concluded that the E.C.’s claim raised
separation of powers and national sovereignty concerns.232
According to the court, Pasquantino did not cast sufficient doubt on its
prior decision in European Community I to warrant reversal.233 First, the wire
fraud prosecution in Pasquantino did not raise the separation of powers
concerns that were raised by the E.C.’s claim.234 The political branches were
directly involved in the wire fraud prosecution in Pasquantino.235 “[C]oncerns
about separation of powers [are] greatly diminished where the government
brings a prosecution within the bounds of a statute created by Congress.”236
On the other hand, executive branch involvement was not apparent in the
E.C.’s civil RICO claim.237 The claim was brought by a foreign government,
not by the Executive.238 Furthermore, the court repeated its assertion from
European Community I that the Executive had not signaled express consent to
the E.C.’s claim.239
Second, according to the Second Circuit, the wire fraud prosecution in
Pasquantino did not raise the national sovereignty concerns that were present
in European Community II.240 Pasquantino involved a prosecution under the
federal wire fraud statute.241 The “‘primary object’” of Pasquantino was the
enforcement of a domestic statute.242 Foreign tax law was only enforced in an
“attenuated sense.”243 By contrast, the substance of the E.C.’s claim was the
collection of foreign revenue.244 According to the court, it was not enough that
the use of the “private prosecutor” mechanism of RICO might further a

230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.

European Cmty. v. R.J.R. Nabisco Co., 544 U.S. 1012 (2005).
European Cmty. II, 424 F.3d 175, 181–82 (2d Cir. 2005).
See id. at 180.
Id. at 179.
See id. at 181.
See id.
European Cmty. II, 424 F.3d at 181.
See id.
See id.
Id.
See id. at 180–81.
See European Cmty. II, 424 F.3d at 180.
Id. at 181–82.
Id. at 181.
Id. at 182.
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domestic law enforcement interest.245 The court’s reasoning on this point was
succinct: “Whatever the merits of this argument, Pasquantino does not endorse
it.”246
V. ANALYSIS OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT’S REVENUE RULE DECISIONS
In Attorney General of Canada and European Community I and II, the
Second Circuit adopted an unnecessarily expansive reading of the revenue rule.
The court held that the E.C.’s claim implicated separation of powers and
national sovereignty concerns. As this section will show, however, these
concerns were overstated. The separation of powers concerns were diminished
because the political branches have implicitly consented to civil RICO claims
against cigarette-makers. The national sovereignty concerns were also
diminished because the claim could have been characterized as the direct
enforcement of a domestic statute rather than the extraterritorial enforcement
of a foreign tax law. This section also addresses the likely isolationist impact
of the Second Circuit’s decision to expand the scope of the revenue rule.
Finally, this section argues that the revenue rule should be reduced in the civil
RICO context in recognition of contemporary concerns in a global economy.
A.

Separation of Powers Concerns

While neither political branch expressly consented to the E.C.’s claim,
both branches have signaled their implied consent to civil RICO claims
asserted by foreign governments against cigarette-makers. The legislative
history of the Patriot Act indicates that Congress approves of such claims. In
addition, the executive branch’s consent should be presumed because the
E.C.’s claim would have furthered the international law enforcement policy of
eradicating organized crime and terrorism.
First, the legislative history of the Patriot Act is strong evidence of
Congress’s intent to expose cigarette-makers to civil liability under RICO.
Granted, legislative intent to depart from a well-settled principle of law must
be expressed in unequivocal language.247 However, the revenue rule is not a
well-settled principle of law. As the Supreme Court in Pasquantino found, the
“line . . . between impermissible and permissible ‘enforcement’ of foreign
revenue law has . . . always been unclear.”248 The Court examined revenue
rule jurisprudence beginning with Lord Mansfield’s earliest formulation of the
doctrine.249 The Court concluded “that the extent to which the revenue rule
barred indirect recognition of foreign revenue laws was unsettled as of 1952,”
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.

See id.
European Cmty. II, 424 F.3d at 182.
European Cmty. I, 355 F.3d 123, 132 (2d Cir. 2004).
Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349, 367 (2004).
See id. at 360–68.
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the year in which Congress enacted the federal wire fraud statute.250 RICO
was enacted in 1970.251 Little change in revenue rule jurisprudence occurred
between 1952 and 1970.252 The Pasquantino Court’s conclusion that the
revenue rule was unsettled law should apply as well to the analysis in the civil
RICO context. Therefore, because the revenue rule does not qualify as a wellsettled principle of law, something less than “unequivocal [statutory]
language” should suffice as persuasive evidence of legislative intent.
The deletion of the rule of construction from the Patriot Act is therefore
sufficient evidence of legislative intent to reduce the scope of the revenue rule.
The Supreme Court has recognized the act of deletion as persuasive evidence
of legislative intent. For example, deletion of a statutory definition is
persuasive evidence of Congress’s intent to leave to the courts the
responsibility of providing a definition.253 Here, Congress considered the issue
of civil RICO claims brought by foreign governments against cigarette-makers
and decided to delete the rule of construction from the Patriot Act that would
have exempted cigarette-makers from such civil liability.254 Therefore, the
Second Circuit should have been more willing to read the deletion of the rule
of construction as evidence of legislative intent to approve the E.C.’s claim
against the defendant cigarette maker.255
The section-by-section analyses, each submitted to one of the Houses of
Congress, indicate that the deletion of the rule of construction was studied and
intentional.256 The Supreme Court has previously found such analyses
persuasive legislative history, especially where the separate analyses are
consistent.257 The Second Circuit itself had previously observed that it must be
presumed that “[t]he legislators . . . knew exactly what they were doing” when
both a House and Senate report contain the “same statement.”258 Moreover,
more recent and more specific legislative action should prevail as an indicator
of legislative intent over earlier, more general legislative action.259 Because
the changes to the Patriot Act speak directly to the issue of civil RICO claims
brought by foreign governments against cigarette-makers, the Second Circuit
250. Id. at 368.
251. See 18 U.S.C. § 1965 (2000).
252. No published federal court opinion mentioning the revenue rule could be found between
the years 1952 and 1970.
253. See, e.g., United States v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. 11, 39 (1969); United States v. California,
381 U.S. 139, 150–60 (1965).
254. European Cmty. II, 424 F.3d 175, 179–80 (2d Cir. 2005).
255. See also Serbin v. Ziebart Int’l Corp., 11 F.3d 1163, 1177–78 (3d Cir. 1993) (discussing
a deletion as evidence of congressional intent).
256. European Cmty. I, 355 F.3d 123, 134 (2d Cir. 2004).
257. Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 447 n.8 (1982).
258. Willis v. United States, 719 F.2d 608, 612 (2d Cir. 1983).
259. See, e.g., HCSC-Laundry v. United States, 450 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1981) (holding that a newer
exemption prevailed over an older, more generic exemption).
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should have been more willing to accept the changes as an expression of
legislative intent.
Second, executive consent to the E.C.’s claim should be presumed because
the claim was consistent with the government’s avowed policies of combating
organized crime,260 terrorism,261 and the detrimental health effects of
smoking.262 The United States has signed a number of treaties that express the
government’s policy in favor of providing support to foreign governments on
these particular issues. For example, the United States is party to the Palermo
Convention,263 which requires member nations to assist in reducing organized
crime that takes place across international borders.264 The Palermo Convention
requires member nations to establish as domestic offenses money laundering,
corruption, and conspiracy to commit fraud.265 The Palermo Convention is an
example of an international agreement signed by the executive branch that
represents that branch’s policy of cooperating with foreign governments in the
eradication of racketeering activity of the type alleged by the E.C.’s claim.
Moreover, because civil RICO claims serve important domestic law
enforcement interests, it should be presumed that the executive branch would
have endorsed the E.C.’s claim.266 Civil RICO claims, by definition, are
260. See, e.g., Luigi Lauriola, Ambassador, The United Nations Convention against
Transnational Organized Crime and Its Protocols, Address at The Millennium Assembly of the
United Nations General Assembly (November 2000), 40 I.L.M. 335, available at
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/crime_cicp_convention.html [hereinafter Palermo Convention].
261. See, e.g., Joint States U.S.-EU Ministerial Statement on Combating Terrorism, Sept. 20,
2001, 40 I.L.M. 1263, available at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/us/news/
minist_20_09_01.htm.
262. See, e.g., United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances, 1988, S. Treaty Doc. No. 101-4, 28 I.L.M. 493, available at
http://www.unodc.org/pdf/ convention_1988_en.pdf; WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco
Control, 2003, http://www.paho.org/English/AD/SDE/RA/FCTC_Booklet_english.pdf (last
visited Nov. 12, 2006).
263. United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime and Its Protocols,
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/crime_cicp_signatures.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2006).
264. See Palermo Convention, supra note 260.
265. Mavis M. Gyamfi, International Legal Developments in Review: 2000, 35 INT’L LAW.
637, 637–38 n.162 (2000). Like the definition of racketeering activity provided by RICO, the
definition of organized crime provided by the Palermo Convention has been construed to
criminalize a broad range of conduct. See Alexandra V. Orlova & James W. Moore,
“Umbrellas” or “Building Blocks”?: Defining International Terrorism and Transnational
Organized Crime in International Law, 27 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 267, 282–83 (2005) (arguing that the
Palermo Convention’s definition of “organized crime” is overbroad and might be interpreted to
criminalize organized protests).
266. Compare Jonathan Turley, Laying Hands on Religious Racketeers: Applying Civil RICO
to Fraudulent Religious Solicitation, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 441, 445 (1988) (arguing for
measures that would encourage injured parties to sue under civil RICO), with Norman Abrams, A
New Proposal for Limiting Private Civil RICO, 37 UCLA L. REV. 1, 4 (1989) (arguing for the
screening of and prior approval from a government prosecutor of civil RICO claims).
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brought by private individuals, or “private prosecutors.” Civil RICO thereby
helps alleviate the significant demands placed on prosecutor resources. Law
enforcement interests have argued that barring certain civil RICO claims “is
virtually certain to increase the work load of federal law enforcement officers,
because, in the fight against organized crime, they will not receive the private
support which Congress intended to provide through RICO.”267 In recognition
of this important crime-fighting function, civil RICO claims are broadly
construed.268
Civil RICO claims like the one brought by the E.C. can be used as an aid
in the war on terrorism. 269 Cigarette-smuggling operations have been
employed to fund terrorist activities.270 Terrorists often avoid fund-raising
efforts that create a “paper trail” and instead focus on black market activities
like “cigarette smuggling, credit card fraud and check forgery, to raise
cash.”271 The result is millions of dollars for terrorist operations.272 Therefore,
in light of the broad construction of civil RICO and the Executive policy of
supporting the international effort to eradicate organized crime and terrorism,
the Second Circuit erred in requiring direct Executive involvement or express
Executive consent to the E.C.’s claim.
In sum, because the E.C.’s claim fell within a domestic statute and was
favored by executive branch policy, the Second Circuit overstated the
separation of powers concerns. The claim presented little risk that the
judiciary would infringe on the foreign policy duties reserved by the
Constitution to the executive branch. The court was asked to interpret the
racketeering provisions of a domestic statute. Like the wire fraud prosecution
in Pasquantino, the E.C.’s claim only incidentally recognized foreign tax law.
There was no risk of embarrassment here because the political branches had
already signaled their approval of these claims through the amendments and
accompanying legislative history of the Patriot Act and through the signing of
treaties like the Palermo Convention.

267. Brief for FLEOA, supra note 177.
268. See discussion supra accompanying notes 168–188.
269. See Lea Brilmayer & Charles Norchi, Federal Extraterritorialiy and Fifth Amendment
Due Process, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1217, 1249 (1992); Dean C. Alexander, Maritime Terrorism
and Legal Responses, 19 TRANSP. L.J. 453, 457 (1991).
270. See Don Van Natta, Jr., Terrorists Blaze a New Money Trail, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28,
2003, § 4, at 1.
271. Id.; see also Frank Main, Cigarettes, the CIA and Iran-Contra; Figure in ’80s Spy
Drama Busted in Indiana Tobacco Smuggling Funds for Terrorists?, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Sept. 12,
2005, at 26 (describing a black market cigarette-smuggling ring in Indiana that raised millions of
dollars for the terrorist organization Hezbollah).
272. See Main, supra note 271.
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National Sovereignty Concerns

National sovereignty concerns are acute where a claim or prosecution
amounts to the extraterritorial enforcement of a foreign tax law.273 Therefore,
whether these concerns are present depends on the characterization of the suit.
The Court in Pasquantino characterized the wire fraud prosecution as the
direct enforcement of a domestic statute that incidentally recognized foreign
tax law.274 The prosecution was viewed as an exercise of national sovereignty,
rather than an “invasion” of the courts by another sovereign’s tax laws.275 In
contrast, the Second Circuit in European Community I and II characterized the
civil RICO claim brought by the E.C. as a suit that primarily sought to enforce
a foreign tax law.276 The court focused on the fact that the E.C. sought
recovery of lost tax revenue and law enforcement costs.277 As will be shown
below, the court mischaracterized the E.C.’s suit and overstated the national
sovereignty concerns.
The E.C.’s claim should have been characterized as the direct
“enforcement” of a domestic statute that merely recognized foreign tax law.
The Court in Pasquantino concluded that a wire fraud prosecution should be
characterized as the direct enforcement of a domestic statute even though it
incidentally enforced a foreign tax law.278 Here, the E.C.’s claim fell squarely
within the provisions of a domestic statute, civil RICO. The revenue rule
should not apply where “American law renders an activity—including the
violations of foreign tax laws—an American tort or crime.”279 The revenue
rule should not apply then when a claim enforces a domestic statute through
the mechanism provided by Congress, even though that claim incidentally
enforces a foreign tax law.
Civil RICO requires a calculation of damages based on the economic harm
caused by a violation of the statute.280 That this calculation is based on foreign
tax revenue is not sufficient to implicate the revenue rule. In European
Community II, the court concluded that the “whole object” of a civil RICO
claim brought by a foreign government was “to collect tax revenue and the
costs associated with its collection.”281 This conclusion is not consistent with

273. See supra notes 109–114 and accompanying text.
274. Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349, 364 (2004).
275. See id.
276. European Cmty. I, 355 F.3d 123, 132 (2d Cir. 2004); European Cmty. II, 424 F.3d 175,
182 (2d. Cir. 2005).
277. European Cmty. I, 355 F.3d at 132.
278. See Pasquantino, 349 U.S. at 364.
279. Att’y Gen. of Canada v. R.J. Reynolds, 268 F.3d 103, 137 (2d Cir. 2001) (Calabresi, J.,
dissenting).
280. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2000).
281. European Cmty. II, 424 F.3d at 182.
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Pasquantino.282 There, the Court considered the argument that the recovery of
taxes was the object of the wire fraud prosecution “because restitution of the
lost tax revenue [was] required under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act
of 1996.”283 The Court reiterated that the wire fraud prosecution furthered a
domestic law enforcement interest stating, “The purpose of awarding
restitution in this action is not to collect a foreign tax, but to mete out
appropriate criminal punishment for that conduct.”284 Likewise, the purpose of
awarding treble damages to civil RICO plaintiffs is to mete out punishment for
criminal racketeering activity.285 This proposition is supported by Sedima
where the Court explained that “RICO was an aggressive initiative to
supplement old remedies and develop new methods for fighting crime.”286 As
the Court has elsewhere noted, civil RICO “bring[s] to bear the pressure of
‘private attorneys general’ on a serious national problem for which
prosecutorial resources are deemed inadequate; the mechanism chosen to reach
the objective in . . . RICO is the carrot of treble damages.”287 Congress sought
to encourage parties like the E.C. to bring suit under civil RICO through the
promise of treble damages based on lost tax revenue. The Second Circuit’s
decision effectively eviscerates the impact of this “carrot” by holding that the
plaintiffs’ objective, which is admittedly a recovery of foreign tax revenue,
should control the determination of whether a claim is a direct enforcement of
a foreign tax law.
Therefore, European Community II mischaracterized the E.C.’s civil RICO
claim as the direct enforcement of a foreign tax law. Based on the reasoning of
Pasquantino, a claim that falls within the provisions of a domestic statute does

282. See Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349, 364 (2004).
283. See id. at 365 (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663A–3664 (2000)).
284. See Pasquantino, 544 U.S. at 365.
285. See Att’y Gen. of Canada v. R.J. Reynolds, 268 F.3d 103, 135 (2d Cir. 2001) (Calabresi,
J., dissenting) (“[Foreign] tax laws come into play only indirectly, as a factor to be used in the
calculation of damages, and do so entirely because the RICO statute itself makes the [foreign]
laws relevant to that calculation.”). Elsewhere, in explaining the treble damages provision of civil
RICO, the Court has said, “The object of civil RICO is thus not merely to compensate victims but
to turn them into prosecutors, ‘private attorneys general,’ dedicated to eliminating racketeering
activity.” Rotella v. Wood, 528 U.S. 549, 557 (2000). Although admitting that civil RICO is to
be broadly construed, the Court in Rotella held that the object of “encouraging potential private
plaintiffs diligently to investigate” would be hampered if civil RICO were read so as to allow an
excessive limitations period. Id. at 558 (quoting Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff &
Assocs., Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 151 (1987)); see also United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 585
(1981) (“The aim [of civil RICO] is to divest the association of the fruits of its ill-gotten gains.”).
286. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc., 473 U.S. 479, 498 (1985).
287. Agency Holding Corp., 483 U.S. at 151.
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not amount to extraterritorial enforcement of foreign tax law. Although the
civil RICO claim might have incidentally recognized foreign tax law,
Pasquantino makes clear that this is not sufficient to trigger the revenue
rule.288
C. The Isolationist Impact of a Broad Reading of the Revenue Rule289
Not only does an expansion of the revenue rule conflict with the narrow
reading of the revenue rule supplied by the Court in Pasquantino, but it also
limits access to the federal court system because a claim against U.S. cigarettemakers incidentally recognizes foreign tax law will hamper a number of U.S.
objectives, including those belonging to law enforcement interests and
established foreign policy.
First, expanding the revenue rule to bar civil RICO claims brought by
foreign governments will impede domestic law enforcement efforts to fight
organized crime and terrorism. As discussed above, the private prosecutor
mechanism supplements governmental efforts to fight the war on terrorism and
organized crime.290 Terrorist and organized crime groups enjoy a steady
288. Pasquantino, 544 U.S. at 368.
289. Although this section discusses the isolationist impact of European Cmty. I and II, the
response to the Second Circuit’s decisions is not likely to be entirely negative. For example, U.S.
investors are likely to welcome decisions in which foreign governments are barred from filing
civil RICO claims that allege foreign tax evasion. See Bruce Zagaris, Ethical Issues in Offshore
Planning, ALI-ABA INTERNATIONAL TRUST AND ESTATE PLANNING 199, 230 (2005). The
Pasquantino decision to reduce the scope of the revenue rule was a source of great concern to tax
lawyers:
The decision should concern U.S. professionals, especially accountants, lawyers, bankers,
real estate advisers, and security advisers who help advise on foreign laws, especially in
countries that have significant tax crimes. Inevitably, they use the U.S. wires or mails in
the advice. . . . [C]ertain economic sectors may be more vulnerable than others. For
instance, due to the dynamic upsurge in the energy sector, many foreign governments are
aggressively trying to extract more revenue from the sector by auditing and bringing
criminal actions against foreign operators . . . . Many of these cases lead to lengthy
disputes, the outcomes of which are costly and uncertain.
Id. at 230. Rather than expanding the revenue rule to protect investors, the more prudent
approach would be to require investors to scrutinize their portfolios to make certain that their
investments are free of foreign tax law violations. See generally Marian Hagler, International
Money Laundering and U.S. Law: The Need to “Know-Your-Partner”, 31 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L.
& COM. 227, 227 (2004) (detailing the importance of exercising “due diligence” prior to investing
in an emerging market in order to comply with the complex and wide-reaching U.S. money
laundering laws).
290. See Brief for FLEOA, supra note 177, at 2.
Law enforcement personnel obviously cannot be everywhere doing everything necessary
to enforce the laws of the United States. Investigative and prosecutorial resources are
spread thin as a result of the combination of budget limitations and the widespread, and
growing, nature of crime. This is especially so in the realm of organized crime, where the
greed for big money inspires cunning minds to engineer complicated criminal strategies to
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stream of financial support.291 Additionally, terrorist groups are more difficult
to monitor due to increasing opportunities to conceal fundraising efforts that
have developed in the global and Internet age.292 Civil RICO’s private
prosecutor provisions are effective in alleviating some of the pressure on
government prosecutors because attorneys for private plaintiffs have an ethical
duty to pursue with zeal even the most “technical violation” of RICO.293 The
Second Circuit’s decisions in European Community I and II therefore sacrifice
the important law enforcement interests that drive civil RICO.
Second, expanding the revenue rule to protect cigarette-makers also
undermines joint international efforts to curb the detrimental health effects of
tobacco use. Thirty percent of cigarette exports are distributed through “black
market” enterprises like the one at the core of the E.C.’s claim.294 The
detrimental health effects of tobacco use are undeniable.295 Moreover, the
detrimental fiscal effects of cigarette smuggling are obvious because the
revenue derived from cigarette taxes is often the primary source of funding for
social programs in developing nations.296 For example, cigarette tax revenue is
the primary source of funding for schools and hospitals in Colombia, where the
government also mounted a civil RICO claim against U.S. cigarette-makers.297

avoid detection and arrest. When organized crime becomes international, as it does in
cigarette smuggling and money laundering, . . . the drain on law enforcement resources is
severe.
Id.; see also Tom Lininger, A Better Way to Disarm Batterers, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 525, 532 n.30
(2003) (listing the federal government’s “overriding concern for combating terrorism after the
tragedy of September 11, 2001,” as a major factor in the low federal prosecution rate in domestic
abuse cases); Newman Flanagan, 36 FEB PROSECUTOR 6, 12 (2002) (“[L]ocal prosecutors noted
that they lacked the experience and training, as well as the resources, to be effective in preventing
and detecting terrorism.”).
291. See, e.g., Larry D. Newman, RICO and the Russian Mafia: Toward a New Universal
Principle Under International Law, 9 IND. INT’L. & COMP. L. REV. 225, 227 (1998) (noting that
organized crime syndicates in Europe exchange over $350 billion annually).
292. See Brief for FLEOA, supra note 177, at 2.
293. Douglas E. Abrams, Crime Legislation and the Public Interest: Lessons From Civil
RICO, 50 SMU L. Rev. 33, 36 (1996); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt. 1
(1983).
294. World Bank, Curbing the Epidemic: Governments and the Economics of Tobacco
Control (1999), at 63, available at http://www1.worldbank.org/tobacco/book/pdf/tobacco.pdf.
295. See, e.g., National Center for Chronic Disease Prevention and Health Promotion, Health
Effects of Cigarette Smoking: Fact Sheet, http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/factsheets/HealthEffectsof
CigaretteSmoking_Factsheet.htm (last visited Nov. 12, 2006).
296. Brief of World Health Organization as Amicus Curiae In Support of the Position of the
European Community and the Member States and Reversal of the Judgment of the District Court,
at 7 n.3, European Cmty. v. R.J.R. Nabisco, Inc., 424 F.3d 175 (2d Cir. 2005) (Nos. 02-7330, 027325) [hereinafter Brief of WHO].
297. Id.
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The Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (the FCTC) was created as a
response to the health and fiscal damage caused by cigarette smuggling.298
The FCTC requires participating nations to cooperate in an effort to eliminate
“[i]llicit trade in tobacco products.”299 The United States signed the FCTC on
May 10, 2004, thereby signaling its endorsement of the international effort to
combat cigarette smuggling.300 Barring a cause of action by foreign
governments that fall victim to cigarette smuggling schemes therefore
undermines this aspect of U.S. foreign policy.
D. The Scope of the Revenue Rule Should Be Reduced in the Civil RICO
Context
The revenue rule should be reduced so as to permit foreign governments to
bring civil RICO claims against corporations involved in racketeering activity
that deprives foreign governments of tax revenue. The revenue rule is a judgemade doctrine that has been modified in the past to comport with
contemporary concerns.301 For example, as discussed above, the doctrine
originally developed out of the judicial interest in protecting English merchants
from foreign trade laws.302 Courts should be willing to adjust the parameters
of the revenue rule in recognition of contemporary concerns.
The revenue rule is an archaic common law doctrine that offers little value
in a global economy.303 When Lord Mansfield first enunciated the revenue
rule in Boucher v. Lawson, the English economy sensed a threat from
protectionist foreign tax laws.304 The revenue rule therefore developed out of
“extremely nationalistic legal and tax structures.”305 Two hundred years later,
298. World Health Organization, WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (2003),
at 5, available at http://www.who.int/tobacco/framework/WHO_FCTC_english.pdf.
299. Id.
300. World Health Organization, Updated Status of the WHO Framework Convention on
Tobacco Control, available at http://www.who.int/tobacco/framework/countrylist/en/print.html.
301. See West, supra note 32, at 1065.
302. Id.
303. See Kovatch, supra note 54, at 266; see also Att’y Gen. of Canada v. R.J. Reynolds, 268
F.3d 103, 137 n.4 (2d Cir. 2001) (Calabresi, J., dissenting) (“The argument [that domestic courts
are incompetent to interpret foreign law] is, to put it mildly, dubious in a global economy, which
requires a great amount of interpretation of foreign laws.”). See generally Barbara A. Silver,
Modernizing the Revenue Rule: The Enforcement of Foreign Tax Judgments, 22 GA. J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 609 (1992).
304. See supra 35–51 and accompanying text; Silver, supra note 303, at 613.
305. Silver, supra note 303, at 613 (“The rule supported these domestic policies [of trade
protectionism] because the end result of an English court refusing acknowledgement of a foreign
revenue law was often to promote British trade that would otherwise have been unlawful.”). In
fact, the Missouri Court of Appeals has noted:
[In the early revenue rule cases] the question presented was whether a contract made to
evade a foreign revenue law or which did not comply with the revenue laws of the locus
contractus, was enforceable in England; and, in each case, the ruling was based upon a
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however, globalization has eroded international borders.306
Fervent
nationalism, of the type underlying the first revenue rule cases, could trigger a
shock wave that would be felt in many nations in a world where national
economies have become so interdependent.307
Moreover, the traditional justifications for the revenue rule carry less
weight in a global economy.308 The judicial competence justification asserts
that domestic courts are incompetent to interpret foreign tax law.309 However,
globalization has, of course, resulted in an increase in international litigation
that necessarily requires courts to interpret foreign laws.310 In most instances,
courts have competently managed this responsibility.311 Globalization also
creates “greater opportunities for criminal organizations to cross borders and
function on a global level.”312 Therefore, law enforcement interests are better
served by increased cooperation among peer nations in combating racketeering
schemes like those at issue in European Community I and II. An isolationist
common law doctrine like the revenue rule is inconsistent with these
international law enforcement interests.

desire to promote commercial convenience. . . . [The revenue rule] was the product of the
commercial world, and arose at a time where there was great commercial rivalry and
international suspicion.
State ex rel. Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Rodgers, 193 S.W.2d 919, 922, 927 (Mo. Ct. App. 1946)
306. See Steven V. Melnik, Corporate Expatriations—The Tip of the Iceberg: Restoring the
Competitiveness of the United States in the Global Marketplace, 8 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB.
POL’Y. 81, 93 (2004).
307. See Silver, supra note 303, at 617–18.
308. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
483, Reporters’ Note 2 at 613 (“In an age when virtually all states impose and collect taxes and
when instantaneous transfer of assets can be easily arranged, the rationale for not recognizing or
enforcing tax judgments is largely obsolete.”); Banco Frances e Brasileiro S.A. v. Doe No. 1, 331
N.E.2d 502, 505–06 (N.Y. 1975) (“[M]uch doubt has been expressed that the reasons advanced
for the [revenue] rule, if ever valid, remain so . . . in light of the economic interdependence of all
nations.”).
309. Banco Frances e Brasileiro, 331 N.E.2d at 505–06.
310. See Roger J. Miner, The Reception of Foreign Law in the U.S. Federal Courts, 43 AM. J.
COMP. L. 581, 581 (1995) (“The global economy has brought an increasing variety of foreign law
issues to the federal courts. Indeed, one international commercial transaction may implicate the
law of several nations.”).
311. See id. at 586 (“[F]ederal courts have shown a commendable ability to get their hands
around foreign law when fully briefed on the issues.”); see, e.g., Seetransport Wiking Trader
Schiffahrtsgesellschaft MBH & Co. v. Navimpex Centrala Navala, 29 F.3d 79, 79–80 (2d Cir.
1994) (examining a ruling of the Paris Court of Appeals to determine whether an arbitration
award was enforceable under the New York Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition
Act).
312. Newman, supra note 291, at 226.
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For the foregoing reasons, courts should continue the trend that began with
Milwaukee County v. M.E. White Co., and was reinforced most recently by
Pasquantino and reduce the scope of the revenue rule. The revenue rule
should not apply in the civil RICO context where there is a cognizable law
enforcement interest furthered by the claim. Because the E.C.’s claim would
have furthered the law enforcement interest of eradicating organized crime, the
revenue rule should not have applied in European Community I and II.
CONCLUSION
The Second Circuit in European Community I and II held that the E.C.’s
claim was barred by the revenue rule because the political branches had not
given their express consent to the suit and because the suit amounted to the
extraterritorial enforcement of foreign tax law.313 The court’s separation of
powers and national sovereignty concerns were nevertheless overstated. The
executive and legislative branches had both given their implied consent to civil
RICO claims like the one brought by the E.C. In light of the important
domestic law enforcement interests at stake in the E.C.’s claim, such implied
consent should have been sufficient to overcome separation of powers
concerns. Additionally, the court’s national sovereignty concerns were
overstated because the claim should have been characterized as the direct
enforcement of a domestic statute rather than the direct enforcement of a
foreign tax law.
Admittedly, foreign policy concerns might have been triggered to a
marginal degree by the E.C.’s suit, but the Second Circuit’s broad reading of
the revenue rule is in conflict with a number of legal and political
considerations: the Supreme Court’s narrow reading of the revenue rule in
Pasquantino, the executive branch’s avowed domestic policy of eradicating
organized crime and terrorism, and the executive branch’s avowed foreign
policy of combating the ill-effects of tobacco use on a global scale. In
recognition of these considerations, the scope of the revenue rule should be
reduced in the civil RICO context.
In any event, European Community I and II represent a convergence of
dual bodies of law. There is the obvious convergence of a domestic statute,
civil RICO, and the E.C.’s excise tax on cigarettes, a foreign tax law. At
bottom, however, these cases represent the convergence of a statute designed
to solve the contemporary dilemmas of organized crime and an archaic
common law doctrine that seemed barely to cling to life after Pasquantino. In
other words, the “delicate inquiry” that once prompted caution now demands
reformulation in a world that shares little in common with the world in which
Lord Mansfield and Judge Hand developed and inflated the revenue rule
313. European Cmty. II, 424 F.3d 175, 177 (2d Cir. 2005); European Cmty. I, 355 F.3d 123,
123 (2d Cir. 2004).
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doctrine. The Second Circuit in European Community I and II effectively
rejected this important reformulation and turned back the clock on revenue rule
jurisprudence.
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